__________________________Yes to the F-16s

_________________________________________by
__________________________________JAMAL HUSSAIN

There are interesting and intriguing aspects to the F-16 sale. In the India–Pakistan scenario, air power had always been a critical factor since the very first war over Kashmir on the eve of its independence in 1948. IAF’s ability to airlift troops to the Srinagar airfield to reinforce their forces in Kashmir permitted them to launch a successful counter offensive against the Lashkars. Two thirds of Kashmir, including the prized Srinagar valley was reclaimed by India in the process. PAF was in its nascent stage and its meagre resources were insufficient to prevent the Indian aerial reinforcement. Soon after the event, Quaid-e-Azam, the founder of the nation made the profound observation, “A country without a strong air force is at the mercy of any aggressor. Pakistan must build up her air force as quickly as possible. It must be an efficient air force, second to none.” Since then, the advice of the father of the nation has been heeded to despite severe restraints.
In the next round of conflict in 1965, PAF has been credited as being one of the major contributors in blunting the Indian land offensive. In 1971, a lone F-86 squadron operating from a single base in the eastern theatre had to take on a dozen IAF squadrons, a number of them equipped with supersonic Mig-21s operating from multiple bases. Control of the air was ceded to the IAF within a couple of days. The success of the Indian land offensive then was just a matter of time. If Pakistan had been in a position to deploy a strong PAF contingent in the then East Pakistan, PAF could have fought the Indian military onslaught to a stand-still, thereby staving off a humiliating military defeat.
From 1971 until 1998, PAF despite a number of political and economic constraints remained an important segment of Pakistan’s deterrence. The threat to Pakistan’s nuclear facilities in Kahuta during the 80s in the previous century was very real. The elaborate air defence set up that included both active and passive measures averted the threat. The prevailing geo-political environment in the region then where Pakistan was a key US ally against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan also helped. A green signal from USA for an lndo-Israeli air assault on Pakistan’s nuclear facilities was apparently not forthcoming.
From 1985 onwards the nuclear deterrence in the ‘ambiguous’ form had been introduced in the Subcontinent. In the early stage, aircraft was the only means of delivery of the nuclear weapons and air power thus remained central to Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence. Subsequently, missile technology was acquired and presently Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence is based on two legs of the triad — aircraft and missiles. The Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM) capability is not known to exist to date.
With the nuclear explosions conducted by both India and Pakistan in May 1998, the veil of nuclear ambiguity was removed. This has brought about a fundamental change in the likely nature of war in the region. A short sharp military exchange in a limited area as opposed to an offensive on a wide front has become the most likely hypothesis. The Indian experience of the 2002 stand off has further reinforced this thinking and the ‘Cold Start’ doctrine presently being discussed by the Indian military thinkers and planners is a result of such a thought process.
The Kargil operation from the Indian perspective has reinforced the importance of air power. Without the aid of PGM delivery by the IAF, recapture of even 10% of the lost heights would not have been possible. Geopolitical factors prevented PAF from interfering with IAF’s operations across the LoC. The requirement for a strong PAF by Pakistan and the need to neutralise PAF by India in case of a planned military aggression by them is one of the key military lessons of Kargil.
The induction of Beyond Visual Range (BVR) missiles along with the very advanced SU-30 aircraft and the acquisition of AEW&C capability in the form of ‘Phalcon’ radars from Israel has for the first time seriously challenged PAF’s traditional strength. PAF’s deterrence is being undermined, and immediate corrective measures have become essential. The acquisition of later models of F-16s hence has become very crucial for the PAF and for Pakistan.
Why is the PAF keen to acquire the F-16s, which is a 30-year-old technology, to counter the IAF’s BVR missile threat? This is a very valid query. BVR missiles are extremely complex systems, which cannot be bought off the shelf and easily installed on the current aircraft in PAF’s inventory. Lengthy and expensive modifications are required and in most cases, even then optimum performance is not guaranteed. Unless an aircraft has been initially designed for BVR missile carriage capability, BVR missile installation becomes an extremely complicated affair. In the current generation of PAF aircraft, only the F-16s can be modified relatively quickly for BVR missiles through mid-life update. The later models of F-16s, the C and D versions that are now being offered to Pakistan, have inbuilt BVR missile carriage capability.
To counter IAF’s ominous BVR missile and AEW&C threats, both long and short-term measures are needed. JF-17 Thunder is the long-term solution and when these aircraft join the PAF inventory, IAF BVR missile threat can be met on an equal footing. But the JF-17 is still a few years down the road and their assimilation is likely to take half a decade. A short-term solution is therefore essential. The delivery of the new F-16s will probably take up to two years and with their induction PAF’s deterrence against IAF will be restored.
The present conventional force imbalance between India and Pakistan, which heightens the likelihood of an armed conflict even in a nuclear environment, has to be redressed. Even in the current atmosphere where both India and Pakistan are moving towards dialogue rather than armed confrontation for dispute resolution, maintenance of conventional force balance is critical as is evident from the Indian haughty attitude during negotiations with its weaker (as compared to Pakistan) neighbours in the Subcontinent. The Americans understand the threat to the region and the need for conflict resolution between India and Pakistan. Their eventual decision to release the F-16s to Pakistan is aimed at bringing greater stability there; which then begs the questions as to why have they procrastinated so far.
To the Americans, F-16s have become a tool to keep Pakistan engaged. They are aware of Pakistan’s dire need for these aircraft and have been using the release of F-16s as carrots to ensure Pakistan maintains its current policies along the Afghanistan–Pakistan border and its keeps a very tight control over its nuclear assets especially to prevent any nuclear material or technology proliferation. Since these steps are in the interest of Pakistan as well, it has complied and not releasing the F-16s now would probably result in loss of this key leverage. Release of F-16s will keep Pakistan engaged, so it appears. American analysts have also concluded that Pakistan’s need for high tech aircraft is so critical that denying them the F-16s would inevitably lead to Pakistan eventually acquiring equivalent weapon systems from other sources thereby reducing American leverage over them and causing financial loss to the American arms industry.
Pakistan has operated the F-16s now for over 20 years and is familiar with the weapon system. Although the new models have little commonality with the ones PAF currently operate, conceptually they are similar. A good guess is that in less than six months of their induction PAF would be able to operationalise them. With BVR missile capable fleet of F-16s, IAF’s BVR missile edge during an IAF offensive will largely stand neutralised.
F-16/F-18 induction in the IAF on the other hand is likely to be a long drawn tedious process. To begin with, raging debates about the advisability of accepting the American offer will be conducted in their parliament and the fractious nature of the coalition will make it difficult to arrive at an early consensus. Assuming a decision to procure twice the number of F-16s/F-18s that Pakistan opts for is taken, protracted negotiation on the pricing will follow leading to further delays. Once that hurdle is cleared the process of training and setting up of an entirely new weapon system will begin. 
Four or five years down the line, IAF could have twice the number of operationally capable F-16s/F-18s as compared to the PAF. However, PAF had always been destined to fight outnumbered and its entire air strategy has been fashioned to win despite this handicap. To the PAF, technological inferiority is a far greater threat than numerical disparity. As long as IAF does not enjoy a qualitative technological advantage over the PAF, the latter can hold its own against any offensive onslaught by the former. Presently it suffers from a window of vulnerability that the IAF can exploit. A BVR missile capable aircraft will close this window. The new F-16s will bridge this gap until JF-17s are inducted in sufficient quantity in the service.
To conclude, USA’s decision to renew the sale of F-16s to Pakistan and concurrently offer both F-16s and F-18s to India would provide a welcome respite to the PAF and to Pakistan. However, we should keep in mind that while USA can play a pivotal role in strengthening our defences and it will use this leverage to its advantage, USA also needs our cooperation in their war against terror and we too have a strong bargaining chip. The mid life update of our current F-16s too should be negotiated to bring them at relative par with the C and D models. And finally, the F16 procurement should be seen as an interim measure to bridge a dangerous void. Efforts to obtain the next generation of combat aircraft from more reliable and less finicky sources must continue even if USA does not again renege on its decision.
Note: While it is true that F-18s were developed after the F-16s and the earlier versions of F-16s did not have the sophisticated avionics of the F-18s, the later models of F-16s, the C and D versions have all the avionic updates that are available on the F-18s. Most military experts rate the F-16s slightly superior in the air combat role whereas the F-18s score a bit more on the ground attack mode. In a majority of air forces that had an option to choose either of the two aircraft type, the F-16s were preferred over F-18s.

This column was published in The Nation on April 3, 2005
The original link to the column is http://nation.com.pk/daily/apr-2005/3/columns5.php